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ARTICLE
Biodiversity Impacts of Investment and Free
Trade Agreements
LEE C. RARRICK*
The following Article identifies the myriad ways in which
international investment and free trade agreements interact with
biodiversity. It categorizes these interactions into three main groups
and provides a literature review of the various real-world and
policy impacts. The first part analyses arbitration procedures in
these agreements that investors and trade partners can invoke to
protect their economic expectations from otherwise proper State
action, including regulation that is intended to promote
biodiversity. The next part evaluates biodiversity provisions that
are included directly in the free trade and investment agreements
themselves, or in side agreements thereto. Some of these provisions
reference multilateral environmental treaties and attempt to
provide stronger enforcement mechanisms for those obligations,
while others create freestanding obligations between the contracting
states and provide for dispute resolution procedures. The final part
considers biodiversity as a form of intellectual property and a few
of the various trade and investment agreements that regulate it as
such. As the Article is not exhaustive of each interaction under every
free trade or investment agreement, it is not possible to say
empirically herein whether biodiversity is benefited or harmed on
balance. But it is clear that over time these agreements are
becoming more explicitly aware of their biodiversity impacts, and
the contracting parties are striving for more of a balance between
biodiversity protection and economic considerations. The Article is
intended to provide insight into the wide range of biodiversity
considerations that should be taken into account when drafting
J.D., Columbia Law School, 2019; LL.M., London School of Economics and
Political Science, 2018; B.B.A., Ross School of Business, University of Michigan,
2015; B.A., University of Michigan, 2015. I am thankful to Susan J. Kraham for
directing me to this topic and to Lise Johnson for her guidance and feedback on
earlier drafts.
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future free trade and investment agreements, as well as enforcing
those currently in place. It is also intended to apprise environmental
practitioners of the potential roadblocks and avenues that these
agreements create.
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INTRODUCTION

International investment and free trade agreements affect
biodiversity1 in myriad ways. In some instances they may be used
to promote biodiversity and hold contracting parties accountable to
each other for their respective conservation obligations. In other
circumstances they may be used as a tool to circumvent
freestanding international commitments or even to forestall future
governmental action intended to promote biodiversity and the
environment. This Article surveys some of the key investment and
free trade agreements and provides a literature review of the three
principal ways in which they impact biodiversity. While this is not
necessarily an exhaustive review of the ways in which these types
of agreements affect biodiversity, it is intended to give a wide
overview of the common practical interactions.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II addresses
arbitration procedures in which investors and trade partners can
attempt to hold contracting parties liable for State action which
negatively impacts their economic expectations. This can include
challenging legislation or regulation which is intended to protect
biodiversity, but indirectly affects those investment or trade
expectations. Part III evaluates provisions which create
biodiversity conservation obligations for the contracting parties,
either directly in the investment or free trade treaty, or through
side agreements thereto. Some of these provisions will directly
reference multilateral environmental treaties, such as the
Convention on Biological Diversity, while others will create
freestanding obligations between the parties and even establish
separate procedures for dispute resolution. Part IV then considers
biodiversity as a form of intellectual property and a few of the
various trade and investment agreements that regulate it in that
manner.

1. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) provides a useful definition of biodiversity, adopted here, as
“variability among living organisms from terrestrial, marine and other
ecosystems . . . includ[ing] variability at the genetic, species and ecosystem
levels.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change
2014:
Synthesis
Report,
at
119
(2015),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.p
df [https://perma.cc/RU7B-UJMW].
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TRADE/INVESTMENT-PROTECTION
ARBITRATION

One of the core features of many investment and free trade
agreements is the establishment of a dispute resolution system
whereby contracting parties or investors can seek review of
potential breaches of the agreement. This Part considers the ways
in which trade partners and investors can use those dispute
resolution systems to challenge governmental action designed to
protect biodiversity, to the extent that those measures arguably
infringe on their trade or investment rights established under the
agreements.
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (“GATT”)
establishes important free trade requirements among its 164
contracting parties, as well as a dispute resolution system. 3 The
three most important substantive requirements are: 1) the mostfavored nation principle, 2) national treatment, and 3) a ban on
quantitative restrictions.4 The most-favored nation principle
requires contracting parties to provide the same advantages to all
trading partners for all “like” products.5 National treatment
2. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also Understanding the WTO:
The
Organization,
Members
and
Observers,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/2E8U-89HU] (providing a list of current World Trade
Organization members).
3. Understanding
the
WTO:
The
Agreements,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/E8JY-S8LShttps].
4. Olivier De Schutter, Trade in the Service of Climate Change Mitigation:
The Question of Linkage, 5 J. OF HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 65, 73 (2014).
5. See GATT, supra note 2, at art. I § 1. The WTO Appellate Body has
suggested a framework for examining “likeness” which includes four
characteristics of the goods concerned: “‘(i) the physical properties of the products;
(ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or similar
end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as
alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a
particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the
products for tariff purposes.’” De Schutter, supra note 4, at n.29 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Concerning Asbestos (EC – Asbestos), ¶ 101, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 5, 2001)) (emphasis removed).
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requires all contracting states to treat all foreign imports and
exports at least as favorably as they treat like domestic products. 6
Finally, the ban on quantitative restrictions precludes contracting
states from setting import or export bans, as well as quotas on
foreign products.7 However, all of these requirements are subject
to certain exceptions under Article XX, whereby contracting
parties may adopt measures which would otherwise violate these
obligations if they are, inter alia, “(b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health,”8 or if they “(g) relat[e] to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.”9 These exceptions are in turn subject
to the requirement that they may not be used as a disguise for
restricting trade or used arbitrarily or unjustifiably to discriminate
between countries.10 Arguably, these exceptions could be used to
justify measures designed to protect biodiversity which would
otherwise violate one of the substantive requirements.
Several such measures aimed at protecting marine species
have been challenged before the dispute resolution bodies
established by the GATT. For example, in the 1990s, Chile enacted
laws which limited swordfish catches and prohibited Chilean ports
from accepting swordfish which had not been caught in accordance

6. GATT, supra note 2, at art. III § 4.
7. See id. at art. XI § 1. “This general rule, however, is tempered by some
important exceptions, such as restrictions on agricultural and fishery imports to
stabilize national agricultural markets.” Thomas E. Skilton, GATT and the
Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an
International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 455, 464 (1993) (citing
GATT, supra note 2, at art XI:2).
8. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX.
9. Id. It might also be possible to rely on exception (a) if the measures are
“necessary to protect public morals.” Id. “The notion of ‘public morals’ was defined
– in the context of [the General Agreement on Trade in Services] – as ‘denot[ing]
standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community
or nation.’” De Schutter, supra note 4, at 84. For a discussion of several theories
under which biodiversity is morally considerable, see J. Baird Callicott, The
Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a
New Discourse, 11 ENVTL. VALUES 3 (2002); see generally Katie McShane,
Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?, 16 ENVTL.
VALUES 169 (2007) (discussing the practical importance of nonantrhropocentrism
beyond its impact on policy).
10. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX.
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with the regulations.11 This was done in order to curb the rapid
decline in the swordfish population within Chile’s Exclusive
Economic Zone, brought about by an increase in commercial
swordfish fishing in international waters in the Southern Pacific
Ocean.12 In response, the European Community brought
proceedings before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2000
claiming violations of, inter alia, the GATT Article XI ban on
quantitative restrictions.13 Chile then brought proceedings before
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to invoke its
conservation interests.14 Although the parties ultimately reached
an agreement in 2001 and suspended both sets of proceedings, C.
Leah Granger has argued that the international tribunals served
to frame the issue in competing terms, i.e., free trade versus
conservation, acted as signaling devices regarding the parties’
commitments to their claims and provided political cover for the
parties during the dispute.15 Therefore, while there was no final
decision under the GATT system holding as much, the dispute
clearly pitted the economic obligations of the contracting parties
under the GATT against Chile’s biodiversity conservation aims.
There have also been several cases that concerned biodiversity
protection measures which reached a decision under the GATT
dispute resolution system. In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute between
Mexico and the United States (“US”), Mexico brought proceedings
before a GATT panel challenging a US regulation which banned all
imports of tuna from countries that could not prove that they
satisfied the dolphin protection standards set out in the US Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972.16 The act also required that
intermediary nations—those nations that imported tuna and then
exported it to the US—also ensured that they had similar bans on
the importation of tuna that was not harvested in compliance with
the US requirements.17 The law was designed to ensure that
11. C. Leah Granger, Comment, The Role of International Tribunals in
Natural Resource Disputes in Latin America, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1297, 1318–19
(2007).
12. Id. at 1318–19.
13. Id. at 1319–20.
14. Id. at 1320–21.
15. Id. at 1318–24.
16. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 95-552, 86 Stat.
1027 (2018) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2019)).
17. Skilton, supra note 7, at 459.
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dolphins were not incidentally killed during commercial yellowfin
tuna fishing operations using the purse seine method in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean.18 The US also adopted the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act19 which precluded tuna
products from being labelled as “Dolphin Safe” unless they met
certain similar harvesting requirements.20
In a non-binding report that was circulated, but not adopted, 21
the GATT panel concluded that the measures in question qualified
as quantitative restrictions, rather than internal regulations, and
were thus in violation of GATT Article XI:1.22 The US could not
restrict imports based on the way in which the tuna was
“produced,” as opposed to the quality or content of the product
itself.23 The panel also concluded that the US could not rely on the
Article XX(b) or (g) exceptions in order to justify the
extraterritorial application of its domestic laws. 24 In this case it did
not matter that the US was trying to protect animal health or
exhaustible natural resources because the regulation went beyond
what was necessary to fulfill its objective.25 Finally, the panel
concluded that the voluntary labelling scheme requirement was
not inconsistent with the GATT. 26 However, the parties ultimately
18. Denis A. O’Connell, Tuna, Dolphins, and Purse Seine Fishing in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific: The Controversy Continues, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 77, 77 (2005).
19. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 USC. § 1385
(2012).
20. Report of the Panel, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D., at 5 (1991) [hereinafter GATT Panel
Report].
21. Under the pre-1995 GATT system, parties to a dispute had to adopt the
panel decision in order for it to be considered binding. Skilton, supra note 7, at
466.
22. GATT Panel Report, supra note 20, at 41.
23. Mexico
etc
Versus
US:
‘Tuna-Dolphin’,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/9EFE-YFG4].
24. Skilton, supra note 7, at 469. The panel alternatively concluded that the
measures did not satisfy the requirements under either of those exceptions. Id.
25. See GATT Panel Report, supra note 20, at 41.
26. Id. In 2008, Mexico again challenged the US “Dolphin Safe” labelling
requirement. The WTO Appellate Body found that it constituted a technical
regulation in violation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Appellate
Body Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 407(a), WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted
May 16, 2012).
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settled the issue outside of the GATT system. 27 In 1992, the
European Economic Community also challenged the embargo
measures before a GATT panel, which ultimately came to similar
conclusions that the measures were inconsistent with GATT
Article XI:1 and did not meet the requirements of the Article XX
exceptions.28
Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act,29 the US also issued
regulations designed to protect sea turtles from being incidentally
taken during shrimp trawling in 1987.30 The US later passed a law
which required imports of shrimp harvested from areas containing
sea turtles to meet similar requirements as laid out in the
regulations.31 In 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand
challenged those measures as inconsistent with GATT Article
XI:1.32 In this case, however, the WTO Appellate Body held that
the US regulations fell within the Article XX(g) exception for the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, construing that
provision to also apply to living species.33 However, the Appellate
Body further held that the US measures did not satisfy the

27. Mexico etc. Versus US: ‘Tuna-Dolphin’, supra note 23.
28. Panel Report, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 6.1,
DS29/R, (June 16, 1994), GATT B.I.S.D., at 58 (1995). “Partially in response to
the controversy that had developed over the GATT Tuna/Dolphin dispute, [the
North American Free Trade Agreement] reproduced the GATT Article XX
environmental exceptions within its text.” Madison Condon, The Integration of
Environmental Law into International Investment Treaties and Trade
Agreements: Negotiation Process and the Legalization of Commitments, 33 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 102, 107 (2015). For a fuller discussion of the North American Free
Trade Agreement dispute resolution system, see infra Part II.B.
29. See generally Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018).
30. See generally Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements,
52 Fed. Reg. 24,244–24,252 (June 29, 1987) (describing the regulations as
intending to “reduce the incidental catch and mortality of sea turtles in shrimp
trawls”).
31. Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. 110–162,
103 Stat. 1037 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a)–(b) (1989)).
32. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12,
1998).
33. See id. at ¶¶ 125–135.
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requirements of the GATT Article XX chapeau,34 and were thus
inconsistent with the GATT. 35
In summary, in several cases in which US marine biodiversity
protection laws were challenged as inconsistent with the ban on
quantitative restrictions under the GATT, the dispute resolution
bodies ultimately found that the measures were in violation of that
requirement and thus were inconsistent with the free trade system
established by the GATT. And even in the absence of a final
decision, resorting to the GATT dispute resolution system can
serve to frame the conflict between free trade and conservation,
and act as a signaling device of the parties’ intentions, as it did in
the dispute between Chile and the European Economic
Community.36 Therefore, the precedent analyzed here suggests
that biodiversity conservation has generally been hampered by the
GATT. However, it may be possible to draft future protection
measures which fall within the Article XX(g) exception, 37 and
simultaneously do not run afoul of the Article XX chapeau.
1. Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”)
creates a free trade zone between the European Union (“EU”) and
Canada.38 It is considered a new generation free trade agreement
(“FTA”), in part because it is designed to ensure that the
contracting parties have greater room to regulate in the public
interest through the express incorporation of sustainable
development as an equal objective.39 Through CETA the
34. The chapeau requires that contracting parties not apply measures “in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade.” GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX.
35. Appellate Body Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 186.
36. See Granger, supra note 11, at 1322–1323.
37. Alternatively, it may be possible to rely on one of the other General
Article XX exceptions, such as (a) or (b). See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX; see
also supra text accompanying note 9.
38. See generally Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.E.U., Oct. 30, 2016, O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA].
39. See Emily Hush, Note, Where No Man Has Gone Before: The Future of
Sustainable Development in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
and New Generation Free Trade Agreements, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 144
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contracting parties also intended to incorporate the relevant
provisions of the GATT, namely Article XXVIII:3, which allow the
parties to regulate in the public interest without the danger of
violating their other obligations under the treaty. Moreover,
according to Emily Hush, CETA “arguably incorporates the
relevant case law of the WTO tribunals as well, as can be seen for
example in Article: 28.3.1 of CETA, which explicitly cites to the
holding of the Shrimp-Turtle case.”40 Therefore, the above
discussion regarding the GATT and the cases challenging
biodiversity conservation measures similarly applies to the trade
relationship between the EU and Canada under CETA.
B. North American Free Trade Agreement
When the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)
came into effect on January 1, 1994, it established the “largest free
trade region in the world” between Mexico, the US, and Canada.41
NAFTA provides for three distinct forms of dispute resolution, the
relevant one here being the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(“ISDS”) system under Chapter 11.42 The ISDS system allows
investors to bring arbitration proceedings directly against one of
the contracting parties to seek compensation for the
nationalization or expropriation of their investment. 43 According
to the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
“[m]ultinational companies are increasingly using ISDS to
challenge the legal and regulatory systems and policy choices of
the contracting states, posing a serious and growing risk to the
ability of states to govern in the public interest.”44 There have been
(2018). Note also that removing or refusing to grant a subsidy does not constitute
a breach of investment protection in and of itself under CETA. Id.
40. Id. at 130.
41. A New Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, GOV’T OF CANADA,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/fta-ale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng
[https://perma.cc/DSL8-BMND].
42. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., § B, arts.
1115–1138, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
43. See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:
Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT’L L. 727, 730
(1993).
44. LISE JOHNSON, LISA SACHS & JEFFREY SACHS, COLUM. CTR. ON
SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND
US DOMESTIC LAW 1 (2015).
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some high profile ISDS proceedings, such as Metalclad Corp. v.
United Mexican States, where the tribunals have awarded
investors millions of dollars in compensation for the “indirect
expropriation” of their investments through State regulations
intended to protect biodiversity.45
In Metalclad, a US-owned company purchased a hazardous
landfill site in Guadalcazar, Mexico.46 Although the company had
the proper federal and state permits, the local municipal
government denied a construction permit after the site had already
been opened.47 The governor of the municipality then took action
to protect a rare local cactus species by issuing an Ecological
Decree which included the landfill site in a newly created protected
natural area.48 The company then brought NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitration proceedings against Mexico for indirect expropriation.
The tribunal found that Mexico had indirectly expropriated the
landfill and awarded the company approximately $16.7 million.49
The award was ultimately reduced on appeal, but the tribunal
affirmed that the Ecological Decree amounted to an
expropriation.50 It is worth noting that NAFTA also provides that
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora51 (“CITES”), the Montreal Protocol,52 and
the Basel Convention53 should be given priority over NAFTA “in
the event that a conflict of norms arose in a dispute,” so long as the

45. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (US v. Mex.), Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 107–108
(N.A.F.T.A. Arb. Trib. 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD8A-28QC] [hereinafter Metalclad
Award].
46. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.
47. Id. at ¶ 50.
48. Id. at ¶ 59.
49. Id. at ¶ 131.
50. See Vivian H.W. Wang, Note, Investor Protection or Environmental
Protection? “Green” Development Under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 265–
266 (2007).
51. See generally Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 1, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
52. See generally Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
53. See generally Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673
U.N.T.S. 126.
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treaties are applied “in the least NAFTA-inconsistent manner.”54
However, the tribunal did not address any of these treaties or any
of the other environmental provisions of NAFTA in the opinion.55
In the case of Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada, the
investors planned to build a marine terminal in order to ship mined
basalt from Nova Scotia.56 However, the environmental
assessment (“EA”) recommended that the project be rejected.57
During the ISDS proceedings, Canada argued that rejection was
appropriate due to the project’s location in an area “with an
extremely productive ecosystem . . . [whose] waters are an
important breeding and feeding ground for dolphins and
endangered species such as whales and leatherback turtles.” 58 The
Canadian authorities were thus manifestly concerned with
protecting the local biodiversity; nonetheless the investor objected
to the EA. The tribunal ultimately found that Canada had failed to
meet the requisite standards of fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security, and failed to provide national
treatment to the investment. 59 The final award was recently
upheld by the Federal Court of Canada.60
Cases like these highlight the fact that NAFTA has the
potential to expose the contracting parties to ISDS proceedings
simply for trying to protect their local biodiversity. They also
establish precedent and might leave future environmental
regulators with the choice of either exposing themselves to
enormous liability, or choosing not to regulate at all. Such
decisions may also influence the motivations for future EAs,

54. Condon, supra note 28, at 107–08.
55. See id. at 108.
56. Clayton v. Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04, Amended Statement of Claim
¶ 19, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1144.pdf [https://perma.cc/53BV-VG9J].
57. Clayton v. Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability
¶
5,
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8AG-UQVF].
58. Valentina S. Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment,
Natural Resources, and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law, 42
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 797, 876 (2011).
59. Clayton v. Can., Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability,
at ¶ 742(ii).
60. See Can. v. Clayton, 2018 F.C.R. 436, ¶ 200 (Fed. Ct.).
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perhaps undermining their very rationality.61 This all suggests
that the ISDS system could have a chilling effect on biodiversity
protection regulation, as well as environmental regulation more
broadly.62 As discussed further in the following Section, such
precedent might also have a chilling effect with respect to the
funding of certain biodiversity conservation projects.
1. Concerns with Using the North American
Free Trade Agreement as a Model
The World Bank has funded a significant amount of
biodiversity projects throughout the world.63 As David MacArthur
points out, in some instances these projects are State-run, and
have the potential to negatively impact vested economic
interests.64 For example, in Mexico, the World Bank instituted the
Consolidation of the Protected Areas System Project in order to
“counteract the fact that ‘[t]he high biodiversity of Mexico is
constantly being threatened by deforestation, over-exploitation,
uncontrolled tourism, accelerated economic development and
arbitrary settlement policies.’”65 Since the project is governmentsponsored, investors in such areas as logging, mining, and tourism,
as well as landowners, could potentially bring ISDS proceedings
under NAFTA.66
The World Bank also funded a $186.5 million Water Resources
Management Project in Mexico.67 Such a project could lead to
establishing fishing quotas which in turn might negatively impact
commercial fishing enterprises, opening up the Mexican

61. See Vadi, supra note 58, at 837–77. Valentina S. Vadi, who has proposed
using EAs as a way to also take cultural impacts into account when assessing
investment projects, finds this to be particularly problematic. Id.
62. JOHNSON, SACHS & SACHS, supra note 44, at 5.
63. David MacArthur, NAFTA Chapter 11: On an Environmental Collision
Course with the World Bank?, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 913, 917–18 (2003).
64. See id. at 942 (“[I]t is not difficult to imagine foreign corporations with
investments in coffee plantations soon to be inundated by a World Bank dam
project filing suit against the sponsoring nation, or pharmaceutical companies
with extensive research investments in tropical forests submitting an arbitration
claim against a nation for the establishment of a ‘Protected Area’ under a
biodiversity project funded through the World Bank.”).
65. Id. at 943.
66. Id. at 943–44.
67. See id. at 944.
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government to liability and potentially threatening its ability to
repay the World Bank.68 While both of these projects took place in
Mexico, the World Bank also funds biodiversity projects in other
countries at various stages of development. 69 Therefore, if the
ISDS model is expanded to other FTAs, projects in the territory of
contracting parties to those agreements could likewise be subject
to liability, and the host countries could face increased hardship in
repaying World Bank loans. Thus, David MacArthur argues that
the NAFTA ISDS system, and similar systems in other investment
agreements and FTAs, may have a chilling effect on the lending
practices of the World Bank and similar institutions with respect
to biodiversity projects in developing States.70 This concern is not
merely theoretical, as in practice NAFTA has actually influenced
other FTAs, such as the Dominican Republic-Central American
Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”).71
In 2005, CAFTA-DR established a tariff-free trade zone among
the US, the Dominican Republic, and certain Central American
countries.72 CAFTA-DR is largely based on NAFTA, but “contains
procedural and substantive changes that may affect the outcome
of environment-related disputes.”73 As addressed below in Part
III.B, CAFTA-DR does include some substantive environmental
provisions directly within the agreement, allowing environmental
regulations to take precedent over investment disputes in certain
circumstances. However, not included within those provisions, and
thus not shielded from the investment dispute mechanism, are
regulations whose primary purpose is to “restrict[] the
68. See id.
69. Id. at 917–18.
70. Id. at 942; see generally Jessica S. Wiltse, An Investor-State Dispute
Mechanism in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter
Eleven, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1145 (2003) (expressing concern that less restrictive
environmental regulations in Latin America will not protect the region’s rich
biodiversity in the context of Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations and
NAFTA arbitration history).
71. See Wang, supra note 50, at 254 (suggesting that CAFTA drew heavily
from NAFTA’s provisions).
72. See generally Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement, Central American Common Market-Dom. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 5, 2004,
119 Stat. 463 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
73. Wang, supra note 50, at 254, 274–75 (explaining that the procedural
changes include open hearings, publication of materials, explicit allowance of
amicus briefs, inclusion of an appellate mechanism, and further requirements for
environmental cases).
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management of commercial harvest of natural resources.”74
Therefore, such regulations would be subject to the same attacks
from investors as described above, mutatis mutandis.
C. Trans-Pacific Partnership
In 2013, Anastasia Telesetsky expressed doubt that either
multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) or trade treaties
would be effective in eliminating “perverse” fishing subsidies
which improperly distort the market and lead to overfishing. 75 At
the time there were two strong competing coalitions that were
either pushing for or against further WTO measures dealing with
these subsidies, or in favor of dealing with the issue in other
forums.76 Furthermore, none of the MEAs in force at the time dealt
directly with the problem.77 This was a pressing issue as almost
40% of harvested fish was traded internationally at the time. 78 In
order to address this lacuna, Telesetsky suggested that States
impose unilateral trade measures whereby they would eliminate
their own perverse subsidies and require the same from their trade
partners.79 This strategy closely resembles the approach taken by
the US in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases, discussed
above in Part II.A. Therefore, such measures would be vulnerable
to similar attacks from trade partners under the GATT. However,
Telesetsky argued that such measures could be upheld under the
GATT Article XX(g) exception and the Shrimp-Turtle case
interpreting it,80 so long as they were properly crafted.81
However, Telesetsky has been more optimistic with respect to
multilateral solutions since the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)
was signed in 2016 between twelve Pacific Rim States, 82 which
74. Id. at 277.
75. See Anastasia Telesetsky, Follow the Leader: Eliminating Perverse
Global Fishing Subsidies Through Unilateral Domestic Trade Measures, 65 ME.
L. REV. 627, 628–29 (2013).
76. See id. at 640–41.
77. See id. at 639–40.
78. Id. at 644.
79. See id.
80. See supra Part II.A (discussing GATT Article XX(g) and the ShrimpTurtle case).
81. Telesetsky, supra note 75, at 644–48.
82. Anastasia Telesetsky, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Leading the Way to an
Environmentally Sustainable Global Economy, GLOBAL TRADE (Mar. 24, 2016),
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account for approximately 40% of the world’s aggregate Gross
Domestic Product.83 Telesetsky lauded the TPP for addressing the
issue by requiring the parties to remove subsidies that are harmful
to global fish stocks.84 She argued that this move “can have real
implications for threatened species with Japan as a signatory of
the TPP, which has historically assigned sizable subsidies to its
distant water tuna fleets.”85 Although the US withdrew from the
agreement on January 13, 2017,86 a similar agreement has been
signed among the remaining members.87 Several parties to the
new agreement are among the major players identified by
Telesetsky in her 2013 article, including Japan.88
In addition to the fishing subsidies, Telesetsky has
acknowledged that the TPP addresses the issue identified above
with respect to the chilling effect that investor-state dispute claims
can have on environmental and biodiversity protection
regulations.89 According to Telesetsky, not only does the TPP
https://www.globaltrademag.com/trans-pacific-partnership-leading-the-way-toan-environmentally-sustainable-global-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Z2GH-3KH2].
83. See Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-transpacific-partnership.html [https://perma.cc/DRM2-RDG6].
84. Telesetsky, supra note 82 (explaining that the TPP also requires parties
to “eliminate overcapacity of fishing vessels and deter illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing”).
85. Id.
86. See generally Ylan Q. Mui, Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership
Shifts US Role in World Economy, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/withdrawal-from-transpacific-partnership-shifts-us-role-in-world-economy/2017/01/23/05720df6-e1a611e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.3c473065f9f5
[https://perma.cc/2QGP-6NCK]; but see generally Dominic Rushe, Trump Said to
be Reviewing Trans-Pacific Partnership in Trade U-Turn, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/12/trump-trans-pacificpartnership-trade-deal-reversal [https://perma.cc/4FQQ-WTDT].
87. See generally Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 2018, available at AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
AND
TRADE,
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/inforce/cptpp/official-documents/Documents/tpp-11-treaty-text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HZ3H-5KKR] [hereinafter CPTPP].
88. Those parties are Australia, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, and Peru. See
Telesetsky, supra note 75, at 640–41.
89. Telesetsky, supra note 84 (“The TPP also enables countries to control
company-sourcing practices for the purpose of environmental sustainability. The
TPP is clear that countries can place requirements on the purchase or use of goods
within its territory that justifiably protect ‘human, animal or plant life or health’
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provide considerable latitude for host states to regulate in order to
protect public health and the environment, inter alia, it also allows
the States where the investment originates to do the same. 90
Finally, as discussed in more detail below in Part III.C, the TPP
and the replacement agreement both have chapters dedicated
specifically to the environment which create commitments
enforceable through the dispute settlement processes.91
D. Climate Change Impacts
Climate change is likely to negatively impact biodiversity in a
multitude of ways. For example, climate change is projected to
cause redistribution of species, tree mortality and worsening of
forest fires, as well as ocean acidification and deoxygenation which
could directly threaten the survival of marine species.92 Moreover,
some of these changes will create knock-on effects further
contributing to the problem of climate change, for example through
the loss of carbon sinks and the release of further emissions. 93 It is
the goal of the parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change to stabilize greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) concentrations “at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system . . . . within a
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to

or conserve ‘living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.’”). But see
Catherine Ho, Fact-Checking the Campaigns for and Against the TPP Trade
Deal, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016) (highlighting the concern of some that the “TPP
will lead to more companies challenging environmental regulations in the
arbitration
process”),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/02/11/fact-checkingthe-campaigns-for-and-against-the-tpp-trade-deal/
[https://perma.cc/LAX4KHSA].
90. Telesetsky, supra note 84.
91. See infra Part III (further discussing environmental provisions and side
agreements).
92. See IPCC, supra note 1, at 51, 64, 67; see also AUGUSTIN COLETTE,
UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, CASE STUDIES ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
WORLD HERITAGE 29, 40 (2007) (detailing the predicted marine and terrestrial
biodiversity impacts brought about by changing ocean chemistry, as well as
“rising atmospheric temperatures, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations,
changes in precipitation patterns and hydrological cycles, increased frequency of
extreme weather events, etc.”).
93. See IPCC, supra note 1, at 51, 62, 67.
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climate change . . . .”94 However, it is unlikely that all species will
be able to adapt naturally at the current warming rates projected
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.95 Therefore,
to the extent that international trade and investment agreements
affect climate change, they can also be seen to impact biodiversity.
According to the WTO, the liberalization of trade generally can
have both positive and negative impacts on climate change.96 First,
freer trade can result in increased economic activity and output,
which in turn tends to increase energy consumption and GHG
emissions.97 However, the WTO also notes that increased income
tends to allow societies to demand reduced emissions. 98 Second,
freer trade incentivizes countries to take advantage of comparative
advantages by reallocating resources to their most efficient use. 99
This can have either a positive or negative effect in any given State,
depending upon whether it allocates its resources to sectors which
are more or less energy intensive. Third, trade liberalization can
allow for advances in energy technology—increasing efficiency,
reducing emissions, and lowering costs.100 Finally, increased trade
necessitates increased transportation, and thus tends to raise
GHG emissions in that sector.101
Valentina S. Vadi has argued that international investment
law can help to mitigate climate change through encouraging
foreign direct investment in renewables as well as by preventing
parties from backsliding from earlier commitments.102
Nevertheless, Vadi acknowledges that investment treaties can also
94. U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
95. See IPCC, supra note 1, at 72.
96. See The Impact of Trade Opening on Climate Change, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_impact_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/E4TM-X8MU] [hereinafter WTO Trade Impact].
97. Id.
98. See The Multilateral Trading System and Climate Change: Introduction,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_intro_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/9NLD-9YSE].
99. WTO Trade Impact, supra note 96.
100. Id.; but see De Schutter, supra note 4, at 69 (“[S]tudies are now
converging to show that . . . the increased consumption allowed by trade
expansion raises levels of [GHG] emissions more than the technological spillover
effects of trade lead to GHG emissions being reduced.”).
101. WTO Trade Impact, supra note 96.
102. Valentina Vadi, Beyond Known Worlds: Climate Change Governance by
Arbitral Tribunals?, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1285, 1350 (2015).
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hinder climate change mitigation where investors are able to
challenge domestic environmental or clean energy regulations that
negatively impact investments through arbitration proceedings,
especially in the energy sector.103 Shalanda H. Baker has also
suggested that climate change may alter the investment
environment conditions in developing countries such that they
could be held liable in investment arbitration under investment
treaties.104 Baker suggests marshalling legal doctrines such as
rebus sic stantibus in order to allow developing states impacted by
climate change to exit or modify those agreements.105
III.

BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION PROVISIONS
AND SIDE AGREEMENTS

In addition to allowing investors and trade partners to
challenge biodiversity protection actions through arbitration,
international investment and free trade agreements may also
directly address biodiversity obligations in the text of the
agreement itself, or in agreements negotiated in parallel thereto.
The following Part first reviews the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, a side agreement to NAFTA, which
establishes a claims process whereby an independent body may
review whether the contracting parties are effectively enforcing
their own environmental regulations. This process has been used
in the context of biodiversity conservation, and has an analogue in
the provisions of the CAFTA-DR, discussed thereafter. This Part
then discusses the TPP, which includes biodiversity and other
environmental provisions directly within the text of the
agreement. Finally, it evaluates the US-Peru FTA as one example
of the more recent trend of incorporating obligations from MEAs
and/or domestic laws into the text of the free trade and investment
agreements in order to create additional enforcement mechanisms
for those obligations.
A. North American Agreement on Environmental
103. Id.
104. Shalanda H. Baker, Climate Change and International Economic Law,
43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 93 (2016).
105. Id. at 82–83. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is employed to render
treaty or contract provisions inapplicable in light of substantial changes in
circumstances. Id.
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Cooperation
The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation106 (“NAAEC”) is an agreement that was negotiated
alongside NAFTA.107 The NAAEC requires each of the contracting
parties to provide information on its environmental laws and
regulations, promote environmental education, report on the state
of its environment, and promote research and technology
development.108 It further requires the contracting parties to
enforce their environmental laws and regulations, provide
appropriate enforcement proceedings, and ensure adequate access
to private remedies.109 The NAAEC also allows the parties to bring
arbitration proceedings to investigate potential “persistent
pattern[s]” of non-enforcement of another party’s environmental
laws.110 If the arbitral panel finds such a violation, it will create an
action plan to bring the party into compliance and can even impose
a fine—the funds of which will ultimately be used to improve
enforcement in that State.111 In addition, the NAAEC established
the
Commission
for
Environmental
Cooperation
(the
“Commission”) which oversees various enforcement issues. 112
Finally, Article 14 allows non-governmental organizations or other
persons to bring claims before the Secretariat of the Commission if
one of the contracting parties is failing to enforce its own
environmental laws.113
As identified by Aaron Holland, this claim process was used to
challenge the “Hutchison Rider,” which cut the budget of the US
Fish and Wildlife Service for administering the Endangered
Species Act, and proscribed it from listing any further species as
endangered or threatened during the remainder of fiscal year
1995.114 The petitioners challenged this action on the basis that it
106. See generally North American Agreement on Environment Cooperation,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
107. Condon, supra note 28, at 107 (noting that “NAFTA was the first United
States trade agreement to explicitly include environment provisions”).
108. NAAEC, supra note 106, at art. 2, art. 4.
109. See id. at art. 5–art. 7.
110. See id. at art. 24.
111. See Condon, supra note 28, at 109.
112. NAAEC, supra note 106, at art. 8–19.
113. Id. at art. 14.
114. Aaron Holland, The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation: The Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the
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effectively suspended the enforcement of the Endangered Species
Act.115 The process was also used to challenge a similar rider which
suspended enforcement of US logging laws.116 However, the
Secretariat of the Commission did not uphold either of the
challenges because it found that each were legislative actions, and
thus were outside the scope of the failure to enforce environmental
laws or regulations provision.117 Essentially, the riders were new
US environmental laws and the implementing agencies were
simply complying with the new requirements by not enforcing the
older laws.118
Finally, the Commission can also consider environmental
issues and provide recommendations to the parties.119 On
November 8, 2004, the Commission issued a report entitled “Maize
and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico,”
which addressed the spread and intermixing of genetically
modified corn with native species in Oaxaca, Mexico.120 There is
concern that these genetically modified crops could “contaminate”
the genes of native crops and damage the local biodiversity.121 The
Commission’s report recommended various measures, including
“additional research, a continuation of the moratorium on planting
genetically modified corn in Mexico unless carefully planned and
contained in an experimental setting, preservation of the genetic
diversity of Mexican corn, and application of an ‘as low as is
reasonably achievable’ standard in adopting risk-reducing
policies.”122 Due to a prolonged legal battle, the temporary ban on

Enforcement of United States Environmental Laws, 28 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1219,
1233–34 (1997).
115. Id. at 1234.
116. Id. at 1235–36.
117. Id. at 1236.
118. Id. Later treaties that include similar review procedures generally do
not seem to address this issue. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 87, at art. 20; CAFTADR, supra note 72, at art. 17.7.
119. NAAEC, supra note 106, at art. 10.
120. David W. Wagner & William L. Thomas, International Environmental
Law, 39 INT’L L. 191, 203 (2005).
121. See Kate Wong, GM Corn Contaminates Distant Native Plants, SCI. AM.
(Nov.
29,
2001),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gm-corncontaminates-dist/ [https://perma.cc/XUF3-5LRY].
122. Wagner & Thomas, supra note 120, at 203–04.
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planting genetically modified corn in Mexico has remained in
place, and is likely to continue for at least several years.123
B. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement
Since the NAAEC was signed, environmental provisions,
including those addressing biodiversity, have become increasingly
common in investment and free trade agreements.124 The more
recent trend though, exemplified by the CAFTA-DR, has been to
include the provisions directly within the text of the agreement
itself, rather than in a side agreement thereto.125 As mentioned
above in Part II.B.1, CAFTA-DR establishes a free trade zone
between the Dominican Republic, the US, and the Central
American Common Market.126 Included within Chapter 17—the
environmental chapter—is a non-enforcement challenging process
similar to that of the NAAEC, described above in Part III.A.127
However, explicitly excluded from its scope are laws whose
primary purpose “is managing the commercial harvest or
exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of natural
resources.”128
Vivian H.W. Wang has argued that Costa Rica’s Biodiversity
law could meet that description as it regulates the bioprospecting
process of genome collection.129 Ultimately, it will be a matter of
interpreting what “primary purpose” means, as the law also
addresses issues such as environmental impact reports and
123. David Alire Garcia, Monsanto Sees Prolonged Delay on GMO Corn
Permits
in
Mexico,
THOMSON
REUTERS
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-monsanto/monsanto-sees-prolongeddelay-on-gmo-corn-permits-in-mexico-idUSKBN15E1DJ [https://perma.cc/7A3E2XGL].
124. See Condon, supra note 28, at 109–10. For an example of a nation
advocating for the inclusion of environmental considerations into a trade
agreement, see Katia Fach Gómez, Latin America and ICSID: David Versus
Goliath, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 195, 219 (2011) (discussing Bolivia’s previously
proposed bilateral investment treaty with the US which sought, inter alia, to
“protect Bolivia’s wealth of traditional knowledge and rich biodiversity”).
125. See Condon, supra note 28, at 109–10 (citing FTAs with Australia,
Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, and Oman as other examples of such agreements).
126. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 72, at Preamble.
127. Id. at art. 17.7.
128. Id. at art. 17.13.
129. Wang, supra note 50, at 280.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/2

22

2019]

BIODIVERSITY IMPACTS

89

conservation.130 However, if it is ultimately determined to fall
within the exception, there will be no effective review process for
potential non-enforcement under CAFTA-DR, and the law itself
may become the subject of the types of challenges addressed above
in Part II. According to Wang, “the limitations on the scope of
enforceable environmental law [under CAFTA-DR] facilitates the
opening of Central America’s biodiversity and other natural
resources for market exchange and consumption.”131 Thus, while
including a process for review of non-enforcement of domestic
environmental laws may provide recourse for ensuring that trade
and investment partners do not violate their biodiversity
protection obligations, it is important to consider the exact scope of
the process and evaluate how the review fits in with the rest of the
text as a whole.
C. Trans-Pacific Partnership
The TPP is another example of an FTA that moves the
environmental provisions directly into an environmental chapter
in the main text.132 It has been argued that the TPP presented an
opportunity to protect the important biodiversity of the Pacific Rim
States, including through the enforcement of CITES obligations.133
In a 2011 Green Paper, the US promoted the inclusion of
biodiversity protection provisions with specific emphasis on trade
in protected wildlife, marine fisheries, and illegal timber
logging.134 The final TPP text seems to reflect this proposal to some
extent by incorporating biodiversity provisions directly into the
main text of the environmental chapter.135 There is a general
130. Id.
131. Id. at 284.
132. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 20, Feb. 4, 2016, available at OFF.
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[https://perma.cc/4DWHLGM6] [hereinafter TPP].
133. See Matthew Rimmer, Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Fossil Fuels, the Environment, and Climate Change, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.
488, 503 (2016); see also US TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, USTR GREEN PAPER ON
CONSERVATION
AND
THE
TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP
3–4
(2011),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/ustr-greenpaper-conservation-and-trans-pacific-partnership
[https://perma.cc/4VDVYGNS] [hereinafter USTR GREEN PAPER].
134. USTR GREEN PAPER, supra note 133, at 4.
135. See TPP, supra note 132, at art. 20.13.

23

90

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

biodiversity protection article,136 as well as an article which
addresses illegal trade in protected species 137 and requires the
parties to “exchange information and experiences on issues . . .
including combating illegal logging and associated illegal
trade . . . .”138 Furthermore, as discussed in more detail above in
Part II.C, the TPP also directly addresses marine fisheries
practices.139
Although the TPP has not been ratified, it does provide an
example of the more recent approach to including environmental
and biodiversity protection provisions directly in the main text of
the agreement. Furthermore, the TPP’s biodiversity provisions
have largely been adopted in the final text of the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which
was signed by the remaining parties after the withdrawal of the
US.140 Under that agreement, each contracting party is required
to ensure that there is effective access to private remedies for
failure to enforce its relevant environmental laws, as well as to
establish appropriate procedures for reviewing public submissions
regarding the implementation of the environmental chapter.141
Finally, the agreement establishes an Environment Committee
designed to oversee the enforcement of the chapter.142
D. Agreements Referring to Environmental Treaties
or Domestic Laws
As Madison Condon identifies, there is a recent trend—
particularly within US FTAs—to incorporate obligations within
the treaty that are created by MEAs or domestic environmental
laws, including those affecting biodiversity, as independent
136. Id.
137. Id. at art. 20.17.
138. Id. at art. 20.17.3.
139. Id. at art. 20.16.
140. See CPTPP, supra note 87, at art. 20; but see id., at art. 20.17.5 n. 6
(striking a portion of the correlating original TPP provision which required the
contracting parties to take measures to address the take of, and trade in, species
protected under the domestic law of another contracting party).
141. See id. at arts. 20.7–20.8.
142. See id. at art. 20.19. However, the role of the Environment Committee
does not appear to be as expansive as that of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation established under the NAAEC. Compare id., with NAAEC, supra
note 106, at arts. 9–14.
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obligations between the contracting parties.143 At least with
respect to US FTAs, this is due in large part to the Bipartisan
Trade Deal reached on May 10, 2007, which required future FTAs
to explicitly incorporate reference to a prescribed set of seven
MEAs to which the US is a party.144 The deal requires binding nonderogation obligations for domestic environmental laws and places
environmental obligations on the same plane as the commercial
obligations contained in the agreements.145
There are several motivations for including reference to such
MEAs in investment and free trade agreements. Firstly, it lends
stronger and more developed enforcement and adjudication
mechanisms to agreements which otherwise lack effective bite.146
According to Condon, this process of reference to MEAs works to
“legalize” these international norms by increasing their
“obligation, precision, and delegation.”147 Essentially, it delineates
the exact requirements of the obligations and renders them
binding through stronger enforcement mechanisms. 148 Secondly,
increasing awareness of the inherent interactions between these
agreements and environmental issues warrants addressing them
together.149 Additionally, such inclusion can also be influenced by
143. Condon, supra note 28, at 103–4, 110–11 (listing the recent FTAs with
Peru, Colombia, South Korea, and Panama as examples of such agreements); see
also CPTPP, supra note 87, at ch. 20. The EU-Peru and Colombia FTA similarly
refers to MEAs which cover biodiversity. However, it excludes “tuna, whaling, and
Antarctic marine life.” Condon, supra note 28, at 114–15.
144. See Condon, supra note 28, at 110. The seven agreements are: CITES;
the Montreal Protocol; the Convention on Marine Pollution, Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Convention; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International
Whaling Convention; and the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources. Id. at 110 n.28. Note though that this list does not include the
CBD, to which the US is not a party. See List of Parties, CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY,
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml
[https://perma.cc/VMC4-838Y].
145. Condon, supra note 28, at 110–11.
146. See id. (citing Jorge E. Viñuales, The Environment Breaks into
Investment Disputes 5, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1714–38 (M.
Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2015)).
147. Id. at 115–18 (citing Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of
Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000)).
148. See id. at 115–18.
149. See id. at 350, 378–79 (citing Lise Johnson, International Investment
Agreements and Climate Change: The Potential for Investor-State Conflicts and
Possible Strategies for Minimizing It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,147 (2009)); see also
Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to
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political realities as well as complex negotiation strategies.150
However, Condon notes that this process also represents a
dissemination of the priorities of the more dominant economic
power, potentially at the expense of the political process of the
other contracting State(s), as well as the principle of sovereign
control over their own natural resources.151
In the context of an investment treaty that includes such
provisions, Condon argues that certain investors, such as those
“who establish forest preserves and nature sanctuaries,”152 could
bring claims against the host country should it fail to effectively
enforce its own environmental laws or the obligations established
under the designated MEAs.153 The Peter A. Allard v. Government
of Barbados arbitration provides an example of an attempt by an
investor to bring such a claim.154 In that case, a Canadian investor
developed an eco-tourism site in Barbados.155 The investor then
claimed that Barbados violated its obligations under the bilateral
investment agreement with Canada by failing to meet its
international obligations under the Convention on Biological
Diversity156 (“CBD”) and the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance,157 as well as its domestic obligations
under the Barbados Marine Pollution Control Act.158 The investor
the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 373–74 (2007) (arguing that because
international investment dispute resolution impacts environmental protection
and human rights in addition to economic development, the process should take
these multiple and diverse interests into account).
150. See Condon, supra note 28, at 128–43 (reviewing negotiation theory in
the context of FTAs).
151. Id. at 119–21. For an articulation of the principle of sovereign control
over a country’s own natural resources, see U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992).
152. Condon, supra note 28, at 126.
153. Id. at 125. For a fuller discussion of the impacts of investmentprotection arbitration on biodiversity, see supra Part II.
154. Id. at 125.
155. Allard v. Gov’t of Barbados, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Notice of Dispute,
¶¶ 1–5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7972.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NJ5-FHYC].
156. See generally Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79.
157. See generally Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11084, 996 U.N.T.S.
245.
158. Allard, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Notice of Dispute, at ¶13.
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alleged that Barbados failed to provide “full protection and
security” as well as “fair and equitable treatment,” as required
under the agreement, and that Barbados had indirectly
expropriated the investment.159
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
tribunal first found that the government of Barbados had not
caused any of the alleged environmental degradation, 160 meaning
that the investor could not succeed on the indirect expropriation
claim.161 The tribunal also dismissed the fair and equitable
treatment claim for lack of reliance by the investor on any specific
representation by the government of Barbados,162 and found that
the investor “failed to establish that Barbados violated its
obligations of the [full protection and security] standard.”163
Although the investor had originally sought approximately $34
million for these alleged violations,164 the tribunal ultimately
found against the investor, who was required to pay over $3 million
in costs.165 While this case clearly does not provide a model for
leveraging investment agreements to force contracting parties to
comply with their international and domestic biodiversity
protection obligations, it remains possible that other claims
brought under the various free trade and investment agreements
that refer to such obligations may prove more effective in doing so.
1. United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement
The US-Peru FTA166 provides an interesting example of an
agreement which incorporates both domestic and international
environmental law requirements with respect to logging. Peru’s
forests are home to many valuable hardwoods, including cedar and
159. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16, 19.
160. Allard v. Gov’t of Barbados, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, at ¶ 166
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7594.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HVG-2RCW].
161. Id. at ¶ 265.
162. Id. at ¶ 226–27.
163. Id. at ¶ 252.
164. id. at ¶ 47(c).
165. Id. at ¶ 316.
166. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., Apr. 12,
2006, available at OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text
[https://perma.cc/9C8CBRE2] [hereinafter Peru-US FTA].
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mahogany, which are logged in high quantities and shipped around
the world.167 Unfortunately, the region suffers from widespread
illegal logging, in some cases of species protected under CITES.168
According to some reports, illegal logging might account for as
much as 80% of all Peruvian production.169 There is a forestry
governance regime in place, but corruption and implementation
issues have rendered the system ineffective at stemming the flow
of illegal timber.170
In 2006, the US signed an FTA with Peru in order to eliminate
trade barriers and encourage investment.171 The FTA includes an
article on biodiversity protection,172 as well as an annex which
addresses governance of the logging industry in Peru and allows
the US to supervise enforcement of Peruvian law (the “Forestry
Annex”).173 Under the Forestry Annex, Peru is required to take
steps to actually implement and enforce CITES,174 which it had
already ratified in 1975 but had not been effectively enforcing.175
Madison Condon argues that, “Peru eventually signed on to the
‘stick’ of binding and enforceable forestry measures because it was
also promised the ‘carrot’ of liberalized trade with the United
States.”176 Therefore, the US-Peru FTA and its Forestry Annex can
be seen as intended to strengthen the implementation of Peru’s
167. See Matt Finer et. al., Logging Concessions Enable Illegal Logging
Crisis in the Peruvian Amazon, 4 SCI. REP. 1, 1 (2014) .
168. Id. at 1–2.
169. See ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
FAILURES IN THE US-PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) ALLOWS ILLEGAL
LOGGING CRISIS TO CONTINUE 1 (2015) (citing MARILYNE PEREIRA GONCALVES ET
AL., WORLD BANK, JUSTICE FOR FORESTS: IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE EFFORTS TO
COMBAT
ILLEGAL
LOGGING
(2012)),
https://content.eiaglobal.org/posts/documents/000/000/325/original/Implementation_and_Enforcem
ent.pdf?1468593199 [https://perma.cc/E9ZY-S9AL].
170. See Finer et al., supra note 167, at 1.
171. See generally Peru-US FTA, supra note 166.
172. See Condon, supra note 28, at 111–12. The article “contains mostly
weak, non-binding obligations,” but it closely tracks the language of the CBD,
which the US has not ratified. Id.
173. See Peru-US FTA, supra note 166, at Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest
Sector Governance).
174. Condon, supra note 28, at 112–13.
175. See id. at 113 (noting Peru “sat comfortably in noncompliance for three
decades” after signing CITES in 1975); see also List of Contracting Parties, CITES,
https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php [https://perma.cc/2557-F4D9]
(providing a list of contracting parties).
176. Condon, supra note 28, at 137.
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freestanding international biodiversity obligations by creating a
higher cost for non-compliance, i.e., trade sanctions or dispute
resolution with the US.
The Forestry Annex further requires Peru to pass new logging
laws and regulations, increase criminal penalties and civil liability
for violations, monitor CITES-listed species, and set quotas on
exports of bigleaf mahogany.177 The Forestry Annex also allows US
officials to oversee compliance of logging imports from Peru.178
Finally, Peru was required to pass ninety-nine laws regarding
forestry and land ownership to meet its environmental obligations
under the FTA, a few of which were ultimately repealed in
response to violent protests.179
Since implementation began in 2009, the Forestry Annex has
been criticized as actually enabling increased illegal logging in
Peru,180 and falsification of documentation remains ongoing.181
According to the Environmental Investigation Agency, although
the Forestry Annex contains “laudable and innovative” obligations,
lack of implementation and enforcement has rendered them
ineffective.182 For example, while the Forestry Annex requires
Peru to perform detailed audits at least every five years, none had
been done by 2015.183 Furthermore, at least through June 2015 “no
one, in either Peru or the US, [had] been held accountable for welldocumented illegalities.”184 However, in October of 2017, for the
first time, the Office of the United States Trade Representative
announced that it was taking steps to bar imports from a certain
Peruvian exporter whom the Peruvian authorities had earlier
found to be in violation of the relevant laws and regulations.185
177. Peru-US FTA, supra note 166, at Annex 18.3.4(b)–(f); Condon, supra
note 28, at 112 (explaining that the Forestry Annex is also subject to the dispute
settlement system established under the FTA).
178. Condon, supra note 28, at 112.
179. Id. at 113–14. Some activists also criticized the laws as potentially
making it easier “for indigenous groups to sell off their lands for the establishment
of biofuel plantations.” Id. at 113.
180. See Finer et al., supra note 167, at 1; see generally ENVTL. INVESTIGATION
AGENCY, supra note 169.
181. ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, supra note 169, at 1.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 2.
185. USTR Announces Unprecedented Action to Block Illegal Timber Imports
from Peru, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 19, 2017),
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Therefore, while in theory the US-Peru FTA should incentivize
Peru to come into compliance with its obligations under CITES, as
well as the additional independent obligations established under
the Forestry Annex, in practice it has not yet been entirely effective
in accomplishing either. Nevertheless, the action recently taken by
the US Trade Representative may be a signal that the US will take
a stronger stance on enforcement of Peru’s obligations under the
Forestry Annex. This may provide the necessary push for Peru to
ensure that it comes into compliance.
IV.

BIODIVERSITY AS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY

In addition to impacting biodiversity through investment and
trade protection arbitrations, and through addressing biodiversity
qua biodiversity in side agreements and environmental chapters,
some agreements also regulate biodiversity as a form of
intellectual property (“IP”).186 On the one hand, biodiversity can
simply be exchanged for profit as if it were a commodity.187
However, through the biotech industry, it has also become possible
to turn biodiversity into “genetic gold” through such products as
medicines, enhanced crops, and chemicals.188 This process often
relies upon national or regional IP regimes, which in some cases
apply to genetic resources.189 In many cases though, these laws
violate the access requirements of the CBD. 190 Thus, Andreas

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2017/october/ustr-announces-unprecedented-action
[https://perma.cc/W3FC-UMQ4].
186. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 87, at ch. 18.
187. Andreas Kotsakis, Change and Subjectivity in International
Environmental Law: The Micro-Politics of the Transformation of Biodiversity into
Genetic Gold, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 127, 134 (2013).
188. See id. at 130–33.
189. See id. at 142 (arguing that biodiversity can have asset rather than
commodity value, similar to a patent, under the right regulatory framework).
190. Id. at 142 n.93 (citing Article 15(2) of the CBD as an example: “Each
Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to
genetic resources . . . and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the
objectives of the [CBD].”). The CBD also includes provisions on access and benefit
sharing for genetic resources. This can be used as a tool either to fight against IP
rights, or to “obtain favorable terms for commercial exploitation.” Sam F. Halabi,
International Intellectual Property Shelters, 90 TUL. L. REV. 903, 947–48 (2016).
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Kotsakis has argued that, unsurprisingly, “the market rationality
of genetic gold won over the formal legal discourse of the CBD.”191
It is often the case that stronger IP standards are established
in developing countries at the behest of more developed countries
through international FTAs.192 This can have the effect of creating
tensions among the world’s wealthiest nations and developing
countries.193 Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have argued
that this “could raise fundamental roadblocks for the national and
global provision of numerous . . . public goods, including scientific
research, education, health care, biodiversity, and environmental
protection.”194 This Part thus briefly looks at some of the ways that
biodiversity is regulated as a form of IP, and its interactions with
investment and free trade agreements.
A. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
Under the auspices of the WTO, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights195 (“TRIPS”)
establishes baseline free trade and protection obligations for the
member countries.196 Although biotechnology inventions would
generally be subject to the patent requirements of the
agreement,197 TRIPS also provides that the contracting parties
may “exclude from patentability . . . plants and animals other than
191. Kotsakis, supra note 187, at 143.
192. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. OF INT’L ECON.
L. 279, 281 (2005).
193. Halabi, supra note 190, at 922–23. It can also have the effect of raising
prices of the ultimate products such that many consumers in the developing
countries are unable to afford them. Id. Low- and middle-income states have
begun to push back against the international IP regimes, and have sought specific
agricultural IP protections. Id. at 937–39.
194. Reichman & Maskus, supra note 192, at 283 (emphasis added); see also
Halabi, supra note 190, at 930 (noting that IP protections have undermined the
ability of developing states to provide for certain public goods, including the
traditional preservation of natural resources).
195. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
196. See Aman Gebru, The Global Protection of Traditional Knowledge:
Searching for the Minimum Consensus, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 42,
58 (2017).
197. See TRIPS, supra note 195, at art. 27.1.
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micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and
microbiological processes.” 198 However, the contracting parties
must “provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents
or by an effective sui generis system,”199 such as the International
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”). 200
1. International Convention for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants
UPOV is an intergovernmental organization which aims to
promote the development of new plant varieties and provide IP
protection for them.201 The most recent UPOV convention, signed
in 1991, establishes that the breeder of a uniform, distinct, stable,
and new plant variety must first provide authorization for another
party to take certain actions such as selling or trading the plant,
or producing it.202 Thus, under the UPOV system, the breeder
holds IP rights over the new variety for a certain time frame.
However, the United Nations Women entity has found that
this protection can also preclude local rural community members,
especially women, from sharing seeds as a matter of “ensuring
sustainability, resilience, and biodiversity, and reducing input
costs.”203 This can be the case even where those plant varieties
have been used by the local community for many years prior to the
granting of IP rights to foreign companies.204 In many cases, these
women possess local knowledge and engage in traditional practices
198. Id. at art. 27.3(b).
199. Id.
200. See Halabi, supra note 190, at 930.
201. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ippolicy/patent-policy/international-convention-protection-new-varieties-plantsupov
[https://perma.cc/XYM8-UN8R] (last modified Jan. 8, 2019).
202. See id.
203. Rep. of the Expert Group Meeting on the CSW 62 Priority Theme:
Challenges and Opportunities in Achieving Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Rural Women and Girls, at 12, U.N. Doc. EGM/RWG/Report
(Sept. 20–22, 2017).
204. Id. at 13. The report cites the historical medicinal use of pueraria
mirifica by women in northern Thailand as an example of a plant that has now
been patented by a foreign country. This patent may curtail the traditional use of
the plant. Id.
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which are vital for maintaining the resilience and production of the
crop.205 While the 1991 UPOV convention does provide an
exception for “small landholders who grow subsistence crops,” this
could disproportionately impact women, since proof of secure
landholdings is required.206 Thus, although the UPOV system is
designed to protect IP rights with respect to new plant varieties, it
can be used to exclude local communities from using or sharing the
variety and may fail to consider traditional local knowledge and
practices for maintaining the plant, which in some cases go back
generations.207
B. Traditional Knowledge
Traditional knowledge of indigenous communities is often
important for preserving and extracting value from biodiversity,208
especially with respect to the genetic resources of plants. 209
Although various MEAs such as the CBD and the Nagoya
Protocol210 address and protect traditional knowledge,211 it is not
recognized under TRIPS.212 However, according to Aman Gebru,
there is an increasing recent trend to include provisions on
205. Id. at 11.
206. Id. at 13.
207. Another example of a treaty which impacts crop biodiversity is the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. That
treaty “recognizes farmers’ rights” and “creates a multilateral system for access
and benefit sharing.” Halabi, supra note 190, at 950.
208. Gebru, supra note 196, at 49.
209. Id. at 57.
210. See generally Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, Oct. 29, 2010,
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1.
211. Gebru, supra note 196, at 56–57. The CBD includes aspirational
provisions on the protection of traditional knowledge. The Nagoya Protocol
establishes binding obligations regarding access and benefit sharing by requiring
compliance checkpoints and domestic remedies, as well as the prior informed
consent of knowledge providers and benefit sharing. Id. at 56–57. The Nagoya
Protocol also “aimed to encompass the broader universe of drugs, medical
therapies, agrochemical products, vaccines, and other products derived from
genetic resources not regulated by other international instruments . . . [by]
regulat[ing] access to genetic resources in party states . . . .” Halabi, supra note
190, at 954.
212. Gebru, supra note 196, at 58. However, the Global South is pushing for
its inclusion therein. Id. at 58. There is also a potential conflict as to whether
TRIPS or CBD would take precedence when evaluating traditional knowledge
protection measures. Id. at 59.
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traditional knowledge protection in FTAs.213 In contrast to other
IP issues, these provisions are generally sought by developing
countries rather than developed countries, who usually opt for
more aspirational language.214 One such example is the TPP,
which provides aspirational provisions in Articles 18 and 20.215
The US-Peru FTA also includes an agreement on biodiversity and
traditional knowledge which includes aspirational language
addressing obtaining prior informed consent, equitable benefit
sharing, patent examination, and access to information.216
V.

CONCLUSION

It has been seen that investment and free trade agreements
interact with biodiversity in a variety of sometimes conflicting
manners. Firstly, investors and trade partners can use the dispute
resolutions systems established under the agreements to protect
their economic interests, including potentially at the expense of the
contracting parties’ biodiversity conservation measures. However,
in many of these agreements there are certain public interest
exceptions that may be used in order to defend those protection
measures, if properly crafted. Secondly, investment and free trade
agreements increasingly are expressly addressing biodiversity
conservation objectives in the text of the agreements themselves,
thereby creating binding obligations for the parties to enforce their
own environmental and biodiversity protection laws. Furthermore,
many agreements also reference the obligations established by
MEAs as similarly enforceable obligations. Finally, investment
and free trade agreements can also regulate biodiversity as a form
of IP, with various ensuing interactions with other multilateral
agreements and systems, such as UPOV.
In many of the examples analyzed in this Article, economic
considerations prove to outweigh more purely conservationist
concerns when the two conflict in the context of these agreements.
However, this Article is not an exhaustive overview of the various
213. Id. at 84.
214. Id. at 84–86.
215. See id. at 86–90.
216. See Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge,
Peru-U.S.,
Apr.
12,
2006,
available
at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file
719_9535.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6E2-2FP4].
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interactions under investment and free trade agreements, and
thus it is impossible to draw definitive empirical conclusions
herein regarding whether these agreements generally promote or
hinder biodiversity conservation. One pattern that may be gleaned,
however, is that over time these agreements have become more
explicitly conscious of these inherent interactions, and the parties
often seek to draw an appropriate balance between expansion of
free trade and investment on the one hand, and their obligations
to promote and protect biodiversity on the other. This is the case
both where those obligations arise under domestic or international
law, or are even established as freestanding under the agreement
itself.
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